Graduate Student, Philosophy
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I'm thinking about doxastic voluntarism (DV) about religious beliefs. My interest in DV led me to think further about the nature of beliefs in relation to evidence and truth.
Furthermore, I’m thinking about the role of the will in the formation and retention of beliefs, esp., religious beliefs.
If God exists, it seems that religious beliefs are morally sensitive or they are not morally neutral. Religious beliefs seem to be genuinely different from other ordinary beliefs such as perceptual beliefs. If the preceding claims are correct, then DV about religious beliefs seems to be defensible. If DV about religious beliefs is correct, then one can think of several interesting implications for philosophy of religion (esp., for Natural Theology) and religious epistemology (as a rival to Reformed epistemology (RE) without, however, rejecting key insights from RE). The DV I'm thinking about is volition-sensitive-evidentialism.
In some sense, the works of Paul Moser (2008, 2010) and John Bishop (2007) and John Cottingham (2005, 2009) bear some affinity to the thoughts I’m developing about DV about religious belief. I'm not suggesting that these philosophers endorse DV.
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